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Abstract 
Purpose: This study aims to analyze the relation of GCG implementation and diversification strategy in the family 
company and its effect on the corporate value that is proxied with returns of corporate share (cumulative abnormal return 
- CAR).  
Methodology: This study used control variables which were size, age, and growth of the company. The hypothesis test 
was done by using multiple regression and an average T-test. The samples of this study were companies listed in 
Indonesian Stock Exchange that have fulfilled the characteristics of concentrated share ownership by one family. This 
formulated two-equation models i.e. Dependent variable for equation model I was diversification strategy and for 
equation model II was corporate value. 
Results: The result of this study shows that management compensation, independent commissioners, and managerial 
ownership positively affect, while the number of the audit committee and leverage ratio do not affect diversification 
strategy. The next testing result was a diversification strategy applied by the family company that positively affects 
corporate value. 
Implications: In order to conduct a controlling function, a company must plan the existence of good corporate 
governance (GCG) that organizes the relation and responsibility between many parties involved in the company, that a 
number of regulations, policies, and procedures. The implementation of GCG is expected able to guarantee the action of 
management in line with the interest of shareholders.  
Keywords: Cumulative Abnormal Return, Good Corporate Government, Leverage, Diversification Strategy, Corporate 
value. 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Quality of corporate management determines performance; one of them is related to the existence of good corporate 
governance (GCG) that organizes relation and responsibility between many parties involved in the company. Mechanism 
of GCG (internal and external mechanism) will guarantee management's action in line with the interest of shareholders, 
including composition of board of directors/commissioners, managerial ownership, and executive compensation, as well 
as controlling by market and debt financing level (Larcker, et al., 2007), that also will affect performance. GCG 
application will give advantages, among others are minimizing agency costs by controlling interest conflict that might 
occur between shareholders and management, minimizing the cost of capital, so it increases corporate value and 
increases corporate image through the improvement of financial performance and perception of stakeholder toward 
better future of the company.  
Implementation of GCG will reduce the opportunistic action of management, then generates the best business decision 
making and be more efficient that will protect the interest of the company's owner. Thus, the company's management 
will choose the best business strategy to increase corporate value; among others is applying diversification strategy. If a 
company's management is able to conduct the strategy properly to manage resources efficiently, it will be able to bring 
profit more quickly. For the management of the company, this diversification strategy is not only a private investment 
but also is a strategy that is able to increase the welfare of shareholders. With new additional business segment, the 
change in an organization certainly happens, for example, the change in administration structure, organization, and 
function of the internal system, and process of business management. (Rahmawati, et.al 2018). 
The advantages of the business diversification strategy felt by the company are the presence of a bigger market, more 
efficient resource allocation, the use of existing resources in a new segment, and the appearance of synergy between 
existing segments. All advantages are expected able to increase corporate performance in the future. Diversification 
strategy brings up a number of competitive advantages because diversification allows the company to use the bound 
between different businesses, so it causes costs and other competitive advantage differentiation compared to business 
competitors (Markides and Williamson, 1994).  
Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 
 eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 7, No 6, 2019, pp 691-699 
 https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2019.76103 
692 |www.hssr.in                                                                                                                                       © Nurdiono et al. 
Nevertheless, there are various study results related to the relationship between business diversification strategy 
application and corporate performance that will increase corporate value. For example, the result of a study done by 
Palich, et al. (2000), stating that there is a non-linear relation between diversification and organization performance. The 
study was done by Piscitello, (2004) stated that business diversification has a positive effect on corporate performance. 
Contrarily, the studies have done by Lins & Servaes (2002) and Gary (2005) stated the result that business 
diversification has a negative effect on corporate performance and even there is no relation between both of them (Grant 
et al., 1988, and Montgomery, 1985). 
A company with a category of share ownership that is concentrated on one family enables a very active involvement 
from management and founder (stockholder). This condition might affect agency relations between stockholder and 
management of the company. Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that agency conflict occurs lower in the family 
company, but Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Young, et al. (2008) stated that agency problem faced by the family 
company is bigger, related to the interest problem between family stockholder and minority stockholders. Regarding the 
intervention of the family side that is very active, GCG implementation shows that the family company has a supervision 
level that is very high toward operational activities and is done by management, so it will give a guarantee that 
stockholders include in choosing business diversification policy. 
Related to diversification policy in the family company, Gómez-Mejía, et al. (2010) stated that family company dislikes 
diversification strategy because it is considered risky that will need costs and human resources, so it causes threat toward 
the welfare of the stockholders. However, Anderson and Reeb (2003) stated different thing, that the reason not 
conducting diversification policy is more to the lack of knowledge about acquisitions and new business based on the 
competitive advantage of the company, as stated by Miller, et al. (2008) that top management of company has 
commitment and quality that are relatively high. Both opinions imply that diversification has a negative effect on 
corporate performance (Gómez-Mejía, et al.,2010), while Anderson and Reeb (2003) stated the opposite.  
Based on the description above, that there is opposite effect related to the relation between diversification strategies 
toward corporate performance, this study will investigate the effect of GCG implementation on diversification strategy 
done by a family company and it is followed by the investigation of business diversification effect on corporate value in 
the following period.  
Research Questions 
This study raises issues in accounting science related to the relation between the implication of good corporate 
governance and business diversification strategy choice and its effect on corporate value in the following period. The 
problems of this study are formulated as the following:  
1. Does management compensation of family companies affect diversification strategy? 
2. Does the size of the board of commissioners of family business affect diversification strategy? 
3. Does the number of the audit committee of a family company affect diversification strategy? 
4. Does managerial ownership of family companies affect diversification strategy? 
5. Does the leverage ratio of a family company affect diversification strategy? 
6. Does diversification strategy affect the value of the family company in the following period? 
7. Is there any difference between the value of a family company that applies a diversification strategy and the one that 
does not apply diversification strategy? 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Agency Theory 
This study uses the rationale that is explained by agency theory, that good corporate governance as protection toward the 
interest of stockholders and stakeholders from opportunistic action of management that pushes management to increase 
its performance in order to increase corporate value, so it is able to increase the welfare of interest parties, especially 
stockholders. Agency theory explains that there is an operational function separation of an entity that is in the side of the 
agent (management). Between principal and agent, they have different interests that tend to cause agency conflict (Scott, 
2009). 
In a family company, the emergence of agency problem is more, not significant compared to non-family company, 
related to the conflict between principal and agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). An agent who has the tendency to 
prioritize its own utility tends to reject a policy that can threaten its position as manager. Meanwhile, the principal party 
is having difficulty in conducting controlling function, supervision, and assessment properly that is able to control 
management action in order to be in accordance with its interest. This agency problem indicates that corporate value will 
be increased if the owner of the company can control management so that management does not behave inefficiently by 
wasting resources of the company, such as improper investment or shirking behavior. (Nurdiono Nurdiono, et al 2019) 
Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 
 eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 7, No 6, 2019, pp 691-699 
 https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2019.76103 
693 |www.hssr.in                                                                                                                                       © Nurdiono et al. 
Good Corporate Governance 
According to Gillan and Starks (1998), corporate governance is a legal system, regulation, and factors to control the 
company's operation, that is expected to be able to prevent opportunistic action of management in allocating corporate 
resources, so it can give profit and is able to increase the welfare of stockholders through the increase of firm value. 
Effective corporate governance in the long-term can increase corporate performance and profitable for stockholders 
because it helps the company in conducting analysis toward investment and increasing economic performance as well as 
competitiveness, by promoting transparency on all transactions. Moreover, it is able to create controlling that limits the 
misuse of power toward corporate resources and to provide the means of supervision of manager's behavior to ensure 
corporate responsibility (Oman, et al., 2004). Corporate governance is not only for maximizing firm value, but also 
referring to the ethics and transparency, social responsibility (CSR), especially regarding the globalization that often 
faces many more favorable jurisdiction choices (Fundeanuand Badele, 2014). 
The family company has concentrated share ownership structure that is in the hand of one family that will have the goal-
achieving process of the company that is very effective because it gets supervision from stockholders. This condition 
pushes management to act more efficiently. Therefore, corporate governance in family company automatically runs well, 
as the result of a study done by Jiraporn & DeDalt (2009), that discipline of manager in family company limits 
opportunistic actions of management with the reason that management of family company has the main goal to increase 
the wealth of company and family, and to keep the company for upcoming generation (Chen, et al., 2015). 
Management Compensation 
Managerial expertise and skills are really related to the financial performance of an organization. Therefore, it needs a 
good understanding of the level of compensation given to the management with the size of financial success. 
Stockholders use the scheme of corporate compensation as the instrument to monitor and/or to motivate managers. The 
stockholders want the manager to take action to maximize the value of the organization for the owner and other 
stakeholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Some studies show the presence of a significant relationship between 
managerial compensation and financial performance, market performance, and firm size. Generally, the compensation 
plan is based on the size of the manager's achievement which is net profit and share rate (Scott, 2009). Some study 
results concluded that the use of accounting information to evaluate management's performance can cause employee or 
manager to have tension, revenge, suspicious to a co-worker, anxiety, and lack of confidence, that cause dysfunctional 
behavior, such as the presence of a tendency to manipulate accounting data. Farichah (2017) found that there is a relation 
between compensation and management behavior. However, if management compensation is determined based on 
corporate profit, it will cause deviant management behavior, such as management tendency to report high profit 
aggressively. 
Management of family company tends to have the commitment and high loyalty toward the company. According to 
Miller, et al. (2008), top management has commitment and quality that is relatively high, so management will take action 
in line with stockholders, and really focus on profit that will increase the welfare of stockholders. Management that has 
high commitment and loyalty toward the company shows that the company has good GCG implementation that can be 
reliable as a strong controller toward management opportunistic action. Regarding the characteristics of family company 
management and its relation with diversification strategy, management of the family company will conduct selection to 
do the strategy, as long as it is beneficial for the company that will increase the welfare of management and 
stockholders. 
The Number of Board of Commissioners  
Board of Commissioners has an important role in corporate governance, which is an internal control role that is 
responsible as stockholder representative to make the best decision for the company and stockholders (Gillan, 2006). 
Moreover, the board of commissioners is also in charge of advisory and supervisory of management, as well as having a 
responsibility in recruitment, dismissal, and determination of the amount of management compensation (Jensen, 1993). 
The company can arrange the number of commissioner board with the size in accordance with the existing business 
complexity. Effectiveness of the board of commissioners is measured by the proportion of independent commissioners 
that are the commissioners not from the company's employees, not from a relative/family of majority stockholders and 
do not have a business interest in the company (Nam and Nam, 2004). The appointment of independent commissioners 
significantly increases the independence of the commissioner board and more effective in fulfilling the interest of the 
company and all stockholders and not only for the interest of majority stockholders. Coles, et al. (2001) stated that the 
more independent commissioners that are represented will increase the controlling function of strategy from 
commissioners. Through strict supervision, independent commissioners can reduce the excessive risks that are taken by 
non-independent commissioners. The existence of a good board of commissioner structure, it is expected able to be the 
controller for corporate management for not acting opportunistically that only prioritizes their own interest and ignore 
the interest of stockholders and investors. 
The Number of Audit Committee 
Member of the audit committee is responsible for the supervision of financial reports, internal controlling system  
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(including internal audit) that can reduce management opportunistic nature. The audit committee has functions, among 
others, are ensuring that the financial report that is reported by a company can be reliable, presented reasonably, and not 
misleading. Then, the audit committee also has the task to conduct supervision and follow up toward the possibility of 
material irrelevance that occurs in the financial field and implication in law. Therefore, the existence of an audit 
committee will increase the integrity and credibility of the financial report, so it indicates reduced measurement and 
improper accounting information disclosure because of the reduced fraudulent actions and illegal actions done by 
management. Thus, the existence of an audit committee shows that the implementation of GCG in the company has been 
done well. 
Managerial Ownership  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) stated that the big stock ownership from the side of economic value has controlling 
incentives toward the company's operational. If some company's stocks owned by management, the management will be 
motivated to increase corporate performance that its result is not only felt by stockholders and investors from outside but 
also felt by management as the stockholder. Theoretically, when the ownership of management is low, the incentive 
toward the possibility of the occurrence of the manager's opportunistic behavior will be increasing. Management 
ownership toward company's stocks is considered able to harmonize the potency of interest difference between external 
stockholders and management (Jansen and Meckling, 1976), that will eliminate agency problem, as stated by Black, et 
al. (2003) that company managed well will be more profitable, so the number of dividends that are shared higher. It 
makes external investors can conclude that the company has applied corporate governance better by conducting 
evaluation toward earnings or shared dividends. 
Ratio Leverage 
The leverage ratio is a ratio of debt on assets of the company. Debt can be one element of corporate governance that is 
able to control the manager's opportunistic behavior in managing the company. With the presence of debt, a manager is 
motivated to manage resources efficiently to produce a performance that is able to increase optimal results to pay the 
debt. Therefore, debt is used to change the goal and aspiration of a manager that is fully to maximize the assets of the 
company (Jensen, 1986). A manager who has the responsibility to maximize the interest of stockholders chooses the 
decision that is in line with the interest of the creditor. On the other side, stockholders can take profit through the loss 
that is borne by the creditor. Managers can reduce the value of debt by issuing new debt that can increase the risk of the 
company. This increased risk shifts the advantage from the creditor to stockholders, although it must be compensated 
with the decreased market value of the company. Rational creditors will protect their interest by increasing credit interest 
and protective covenants. The existence of a debt contract can reduce the costs of bankruptcy that eventually will 
increase the firm value. 
Diversification 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) stated that diversification is management discretion to increase the firm size that enables the 
manager to get higher compensation, to reduce personal risk, to guarantee job position and bigger power. Contrarily, 
according to Meyer, et al. (2009) this investment causes bigger agency costs, so it negatively affects corporate 
performance and results in inefficient resource allocation and reduces the firm value (Berger and Ofek, 1995).  
There are three relations between diversification and corporate performance (Palich, et al., 2000), in which the first 
model is a linear premium model stating that diversification linearly and positively relates to corporate performance. The 
second relation model is linear discount model assuming that diversification linearly, but negatively relates to corporate 
performance, while the third model is model U assuming that it positively relates to corporate performance, when there 
is a change of business of the company from single business to related diversification, and will negatively relate when 
the company move to diversification that is not related to the main business.  
A company that is diversified has more accesses internally to various resources including external financing so that it 
causes more flexible capital formation. Many mechanisms can be used to create and expand the advantage of market 
power owned by the company, among others are price-cutting, income excess from a segment can be allocated to 
support other segments (cross-subsidies), to increase obstacle entering the industry. Another mechanism that can be done 
by the company is expanding special assets of the company, and to share resources among segments, such as brand 
names, managerial ability, customer loyalty, and technology innovation. 
Firm Value 
There are some studies that try to connect the variable of the capital market and the special variables of the company. 
For example, Beaver, et al. (1970) found the presence of relation between stock return and some variables of corporate 
performance, such as dividend payout, financial leverage, and earnings yield. Previous research by Fama & French 
(1996) found that a return average of the stock is usually related to the characteristics of the company such as size, 
earnings/price, selling growth, long-term stock return, and others. The study of firm value cannot be separated from the 
return level, dividend payout, financial leverage, firm size, and earnings/price. In the relation between diversification and 
corporate performance, in general, the potential return of diversification decreases along with the presence of market and 
institutional development, so diversification does not improve corporate performance in a perfect market. Chakrabarti, et 
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al. (2007) stated that a company in a less developed economy will enjoy the advantage that is more sustainable from the 
implementation of diversification rather than the company in a more developed economy institutionally. However, the 
studies done by Hernández-Trasobares and Galve-Górriz (2017) did find any significant relation between diversification 
and performance related to the joint strategy of the company. The company chooses to conduct diversification if the 
advantage of diversification is more than costs or vice versa, the company chooses to be focused. Hoechle, et al. (2012) 
found a significant negative relation between diversification and corporate performance. This condition can be explained 
by the variable of corporate governance stating that GCG is related to the increase of firm value when conducting 
merging diversification. 
The study about diversification as a strategy to increase firm value has also been done by Villalonga (2004b), although 
diversification strategy also needs bigger costs. From a resource-based perspective, diversification gives operational 
synergy based on the scope and economic scale, which will increase efficiency. From a market power perspective, 
diversification gives an advantage in competition against competitors (Seth, 1990 and Valentinovna, Nosova Olga, 
2018). According to the financial approach, there is a coinsurance effect, to reduce risks emerging from the business 
merger that less has cash flow (Lewellen, 1971). Implementation of diversification strategy gives the means that can be 
reliable to fulfill financing needs from internal sources. The study done by Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016) gave 
new evidence that diversification produces efficiency in the internal capital market. 
Hypothesis Development  
Relation of GCG and Diversification Strategy 
According to Larcker, et al. (2007), the mechanism of corporate governance includes internal and external mechanisms 
such as management compensation, the composition of the board of commissioners, audit committee, managerial 
ownership, and leverage ratio. Therefore, corporate governance must include elements such as the ones mentioned in 
corporate governance. Fundeanuand Badele(2014) stated that corporate governance is not only maximized firm value but 
how to conduct more profitable jurisdiction choices. Regarding characteristics of family company management and its 
relation with diversification strategy, family company management will conduct the choice to run the strategy, as long as 
it is profitable for the company that will increase the welfare of management and stockholders that is viewed from the 
firm value. Therefore, the hypothesis of this study is formulated as the following:   
H-1:  Management compensation positively affects diversification strategy. 
H-2:  The number of independent commissioner board positively affects diversification strategy. 
H-3:  The number of audit committee positively affects diversification strategy.  
H-4:  Managerial ownership positively affects diversification strategy. 
H-5:  Leverage ratio positively affects diversification strategy.  
Relation of Diversification Strategy and Firm Value 
This study refers to the study done by Villalonga (2004b) that by applying diversification strategy, the firm value will be 
increasing because with the presence of increased corporate performance that will be interesting information for 
investors and potential investors to conduct investment in the company. If the demand for the stock is increasing, 
automatically it will increase stock rate in the stock market that eventually will increase stock return. Thus, it will 
increase related firm value, although Hernández-Trasobares and Galve-Górriz (2017) did not find evidence that can 
explain the relationship between implementation diversification strategy and corporate performance. Then, Hoechle, et 
al. (2012) found a negative and significant relationship between the implementation of diversification strategy and 
corporate performance. Therefore, the hypothesis of the study is formulated as the following: 
H-6:  Diversification strategy affects the value of the family company. 
H-7:  There is a difference between the value of a family company that applies a diversification strategy and a family 
company that does not apply a diversification strategy. 
METHODOLOGY 
Data Collecting 
This study uses available data through the accesses as the following:  
a. Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX)  
b. Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD); financial data from 2013 to 2017.  
c. www.bei.co.id 
d. www.google.com/search 
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Sample of Study  
The sample of the study is the companies with stock ownership in the category of family companies that are listed in 
IDX from 2013 to 2017. The criterion of the family company is the stock ownership≥ 30 % in 1 family or one name of 
the owner who is considered as a family company. The criterion of the non-family company is the company with stock 
ownership held by more than 1 owner.  
Variable of Study and Measurement 
This study uses two-equation models. Equation model 1, management compensation (Compen), number of independent 
commissioner board (Comis), number of the audit committee (Comaud), managerial ownership (Comgr), and leverage 
ratio (Lev) as independent variables with diversification strategy (Divr) as the dependent variable. Testing with equation 
model II, diversification strategy ( Divr) as an independent variable with firm value(Valf)as the dependent variable. This 
study also includes control variables of firm size (Size), firm age (Age) and firm growth (Gro). 
Measurement of Dependent Variable  
Measurement of variable diversification (Divr) is done by using the Herfindahl-Hiraschman Index that is measured from 
the number of squares from sales of each segment divided by the total sales of the company (Liebenberg& Sommer, 
2008). Measurement of variable corporate performance is placed as a dependent variable, using the proxy of cumulative 
outstanding stock market rate(CAR) at the end of the reporting period (Hartono, 2013). 
Measurement of Independent Variable  
Companies measured by logarithm from the number of burdens spent by the company for management expenses post 
(employee) for one period that is reported in the financial report. Comis is measured by the presence or the absence of 
independent commissioners. Comaud is measured by the presence or the absence of an audit committee formed by the 
company. Comgr is measured by the presence or the absence of stock owned by corporate management. Lev is measured 
by the ratio of debt on assets of the company. This study uses variables of firm size (Size), firm age (Age), and firm 
growth (Gro) as controlling variables that are measured with logarithm from the total assets of company for variable 
Size, natural logarithm of the firm age for variable Age, and the logarithm of sales total change, and the logarithm of 
sales total change from present year for variable Gro. 
Testing of Study Hypothesis  
The testing of hypothesis H-1 to H-6 uses regression analysis (Ordinary Least Square - OLS) to disclose the relationship 
of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. The testing on these hypotheses is completed with 
the classical assumption test, and F-test, and t-test. Hypothesis H-& is tested using Compare Means-independent 
Samples T-Test. 
Analysis Model  
Analysis model used to test H-1 to H-5 formulated in this study is multiple regression with equation models as the 
following:  
Equation Model I: 
Divr = a1 + b11 Compen +b12 Comis + b13 Comaud + b14Comgr+ b15Lev +  b16 Size + b17 Age + b18 Gro + e1i 
Equation Model II: 
Valf  = a2 + b21 Divr +b22 Size + b23Age + b24 Gro + e2i 
DISCUSSION 
The testing result of the effect of management compensation and independent commissioner on diversification strategy 
shows a positive and significant effect. It means that fair compensation determination pushes management to conduct 
diversification implementation as the form of responsibility from executives in running duty to increase performance 
effectively and innovatively, which promotes the presence of creativity that enables diversification implementation. 
Although according to Gómez-Mejía, et al. (2010) implementation of diversification policy in the family company is less 
liked because it is risky, that will need bigger costs and human resources, so it causes a threat toward the welfare of 
stockholders. 
While independent commissioner of a company is able to encourage executives to act positively, as business 
diversification strategy implementation that is able to increase corporate performance. (Nurdiono Nurdiono, et al 2019). 
Thus, it can be meant that an independent commissioner is one of element from GCG that is able to decrease 
opportunistic action of management, and will create positive motivation to make the best business decision, and improve 
the ability to run the business more efficiently, as well as protecting the interest of the owner of company. 
Meanwhile, managerial ownership, audit committee, and leverage ratio do not affect diversification strategy. This 
conclusion supports the thought of Gómez-Mejía, et al. (2010) that family company is less favorable because it is 
Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 
 eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 7, No 6, 2019, pp 691-699 
 https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2019.76103 
697 |www.hssr.in                                                                                                                                       © Nurdiono et al. 
considered to have risks that cause the threat toward the welfare of stockholders, including managers and executives. 
Moreover, although the existence of audit committee members also can reduce the opportunistic nature of management, 
in the family company, the possibility is less needed. It is because the family company has very active participation from 
management from the family of stockholders or the founder of the company, so the internal supervision is adequately 
done by corporate management. Moreover, although Larcker, et al. (2007) stated that debt financing level is one element 
of good corporate governance implementation, for a company under the control of family with management that is 
mostly from the family member of the owner, it might decide to prioritize the internal financing sources as the 
operational financing sources of company. 
Company that applies diversification strategy will have access internally and externally to various resources, so it is able 
to operate more flexibly, create and expand the market benefits owned, and is able to expand for using advantages of 
assets and various resources among segments, such as brand names, managerial ability, customer loyalty, and technology 
innovation. As the study was done by Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016), it gave new evidence that diversification 
produces efficiency in the internal capital market. The ability owned is the potential achievement of better corporate 
performance that is able to generate an increase in firm value.  
CONCLUSION 
This study succeeded to reveal that variables of management compensation and independent commissioner significantly 
affect business diversification strategy implementation in the company that is categorized as a family company. It means 
that a family company with an adequate compensation system and independent commissioner tends to have the 
willingness to apply a business diversification strategy. Meanwhile, managerial ownership, audit committee, and 
leverage ratio are proven do not affect, meaning that managerial ownership, audit committee, and leverage ratio level of 
a family company tend to be meaningless to management in conducting diversification strategy implementation. 
This study is also able to prove that the variable of business diversification that is implemented relates positively and 
affects the firm value that is proxies with the magnitude of cumulative abnormal return. It means that the applied 
diversification strategy is able to increase firm value. If diversification strategy is run well, there will be a company's 
operationalization system that is done efficiently as well as good synergy among units, so it is able to encourage the 
increase of firm value. It is also shown by the result of this study that it is also able to reveal that the value of a family 
company that applies a diversification strategy bigger than a family company that does not apply the strategy.  
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